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 The emergence of pensioners’ parties in contemporary Europe 
 
Introduction 
 
Party politics in contemporary Europe often exhibit marked generational biases. Older 
voters are both more to turn out to vote to support political parties at elections and to 
be members of political parties (Goerres 2009). Conversely, younger votes are 
increasingly disinclined  to participate in formal party-electoral politics leading to 
concern over the ‘greying’ of  party democracy and of socio-political organizations 
(Henn, Weinstein and Wring 2002; Phelps 2006; Goerres 2009; Robertson 2009). 
Certain (types of) party are disproportionately supported by older age groups. Indeed, 
in certain cases – as with the members of the British Conservative Party during 1990s 
(Whitely, Syed and Richardson 1994) or the electorate of the Czech Republic’s 
Communist Party (Hanley 2001), older age cohorts can find themselves in the 
majority, significantly affecting the way such parties understand, prioritize and 
respond to issues of the day and often tending to narrow their political appeal over 
time.  
 
However, the possibility that population ageing and the growing salience of issues 
relating to ageing societies might generate pressures for the emergence of new parties 
has been largely overlooked. This is in many ways unsurprising. Despite the 
emergence at the margins of political systems across Europe of pensioners and 
retirees’ parties over the last two decades years, such  ‘grey interest’ parties’ (Goerres 
2006: 148), appear on first examination a fringe phenomenon of little importance 
(Walker 1998; Goerres 2009: 72-4). 
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 Nevertheless, grey interest parties arguably 
merit closer examination both as socio-political phenomena in themselves and as a 
potential new party family in the making in European politics. As Herzog (1987) 
suggests, regardless of their vote-getting potential, newly emerging minor parties can 
serve as a marker for emergence of new issues and an early indicator that (wider) 
groups of voters may be re-defining and re-negotiate socio-political identities or 
seeking vehicles for protest. Moreover, in a number of European states grey interest 
parties have already enjoyed sufficient electoral success to exercise political leverage. 
Indeed, a small number of cases, they have even entered government.  
 
This chapter maps the emergence of pensioners’ parties over the last two decades in 
both established West European democracies and the newer post-communist 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).  It then examines the reasons for 
the emergence and, in certain cases, the relative success of pensioners’ parties 
highlighting both the ‘demand’ for such parties generated by socio-economic and 
demographic change and the of ‘supply’ political opportunity for their emergence 
thrown up by electoral systems and configurations of established parties. It concludes 
with a brief assessment of the prospects of pensioners’ parties and the possibility that 
they might establish themselves as a minor party family in European politics.  
 
The emergence of pensioners’ parties 
 
                                                 
1
 Following Goerres (2009: 72), I take a ‘grey interest’ party to be any organization contesting (or 
planning to contest) elections which signals through its name and/or founding documents that it seeks 
mainly to represent the interests of pensioners and/or older voters.  
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Pensioners’ interest organizations in Western Europe generally date from 1940s and 
1950s and in some cases the interwar period. The precise form of such organizations 
varied both historically and by national context, reflecting specific patterns of 
‘pillarization’ and/or ‘partification’ of social life or specific strategies of mass 
organization. A further wave of new older people’s social and political organizations 
emerged sporadically across from 1970s  across Western Europe in the context of the 
‘new politics of old age’ generated by the twin processes of population ageing and the 
contraction and reconfiguration of post-war welfare states (Walker 1998; Ever and 
Wolf 1999). 
 
In West European democracies, pensioners’ parties emerged as a fringe phenomenon 
in late 1980s and early 1990s. Although there were reports of an ‘Autonomous Party 
of Pensioners’ contesting Italian parliamentary elections as early as 1972 (Time, 22 
March 1972, as table 1 shows, the first pensioners’ party to emerge in a Western 
democracy for which firm evidence is available was founded in Israel in 1981 – the 
first in a series of generally peripheral ‘grey’ groupings to emerge in Israeli electoral 
politics before the unexpected electoral breakthrough of the GIL party in 2006 
(Iecovich 2002; Derfner 2006; Susser 2007). The first grey party to emerge in 
Western Europe proper was Italy’s Partito dei Pensionati (PP) founded in 1987. 
Thereafter pensioners’ parties were formed in Germany, Scandinavia, the Benelux 
countries and Portugal. More recently, several pensioners’ parties have also emerged 
seem the United Kingdom.  The Scottish Senior Citizens’ Unity Party (SSCUP) was 
founded in 2003 and had one representative elected to the Scottish Parliament in 
elections of that year. Several more peripheral and localized groups emerged in 
England and Wales around the time of the 2005 general election. Overall, it appears 
only three countries in Western Europe saw no grey interest parties form: Ireland, 
Iceland and France.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As table 1 shows West European pensioners’ parties have so far remained a largely 
peripheral phenomenon. Some have almost no electoral support at national level, 
although most have been able to gain 1-2 per cent of the vote in national elections on 
at least one occasion and many have some representation at sub-national level. A 
small number of ‘grey’ parties have exceeded this level of support, the most notable 
cases being Holland’s General Elderly Alliance (AOV) (van Stipdonk and van 
Holsteyn 1995; Thornton 1995), which was represented in the Dutch parliament 
between 1994 and 1998, and Luxembourg’s Alternative Democratic Reform Party 
(ADR) which has polled close to 10 per cent of the national vote in successive 
parliamentary elections and has become an established parliamentary party. In neither 
case, however, did these grey interest groupings enter government, nor were they 
considered as potential coalition partners. Israel thus offers the only instance of a 
pensioners’ party holding government office in an established Western democracy. 
The Israeli pensioners’ party GIL which was represented in the Knesset between 2006 
and 2009 was a junior partner in the coalition administration led by the centrist 
Kadima movement. Pensioners’ parties have also contested European elections on 
several occasions. However, only one, Italy’s Partito dei Pensionati (PP) which 
gained one MEP in 2004, has had any representation in the European Parliament.    
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Pensioners’ parties have also widely emerged in post-communist Europe but, as in 
Western Europe, been have remained a largely peripheral and short-lived 
phenomenon. As table 2 shows ‘grey’ groupings formed in almost all post-communist 
democracies in CEE, the earliest emerging in the early-mid 1990s in he rapidly 
reforming Central European states. Pensioners’ parties have also developed more 
recently in Russia, Ukraine and South East European states such Croatia, Serbia and 
Bulgaria, where the region’s newest grey party, the Social Solidarity Movement, was 
founded in July 2007 after months of protest demonstrations by older people in Sofia 
against the Bulgarian government’s failure to uprate pensions (Novinite 2007). In 
post-communist Europe, despite the existence of numerous electoral lists for the 
‘underprivileged’ or ‘social justice’, pensioners’ parties seem to be absent in Albania, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As in Western Europe, the success of Eastern and Central Europe’s grey interest 
parties has been limited and few have established themselves on a longer term basis. 
Many, such as Hungary’s National Pensioners’ Party or Slovakia’s two short-lived 
pensioner groupings, appear effectively defunct, while others have merged, either 
temporarily or permanently, with larger electoral groupings. In general, however, 
pensioner parties appeared to perform somewhat more successfully in the post-
communist Central and Eastern Europe than in West European democracies. Several 
grey groupings in the region performed as credible extra-parliamentary groupings in 
parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic (1992, 1996 and 1998), Estonia (1993), 
Poland (1997) often polling 2-3 per cent -  a level of support usually sufficient to 
access state funding and offer a realistic chance of crossing electoral thresholds. 
Pensioners’ parties have entered national parliaments in four post-communist states 
(Russia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia).  
 
Of these three have been represented in a government, the Democratic Party of 
Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) has held government office as junior partner in 
coalitional governments of left and right for more than a decade. Having increasing its 
vote from 4.04 per cent to 7.47 per cent in the 2008 parliamentary elections, DeSUS is 
currently a partner in Slovenia’s centre-left coalition government and has two 
ministerial portfolios. Similarly, the Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS) also 
won parliamentary representation in Serbia’s 2008 parliamentary elections as part of 
coalition led by the Socialist Party of Serbia and subsequently entered government 
when this bloc became a junior member of the pro-European administration of Prime 
Minister Mirko Cvetković. The party’s leader Jovan Krkobabić is currently a Deputy 
Prime Minister and has responsibility for several social affairs portfolios. The 
Croatian Pensioners’ Party (HSU) ,which unexpectedly entered parliament in 2003 
and retained one deputy in 2007 elections, has also exercised some influence on 
government acted as a ‘support party’ for successive administrations led by the 
reformed nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). 
 
Ideology and impact 
 
In both Western and Eastern European pensioners’ parties articulate straightforward 
(usually short-term) material demands linked to distributional issues and represent 
themselves as a non-partisan voice for ‘old folk’ generally, in a way which gives them 
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a degree of legitimacy and insulation from political attack. Their demands have 
centred on a series of essentially similar concerns: higher (and more regularly and 
effectively uprated) pensions; improvements in public services heavily used by older 
people such as health, social care and public transport; reductions in tax or reduced 
charges for public services for old people; and measures to combat age discrimination 
and change the social climate to give greater recognition and status to older people. 
Such demands are usually been expressed in short programmatic statements, which do 
not generally attempt to develop broader policy prescriptions or formulate detailed 
ideological standpoints.  
 
At the same time, however, most pensioners’ parties seek to represent themselves as 
more something more than mere sectional interest. Some project themselves as 
reformers contributing to the general debate about social cohesion and 
intergenerational solidarity. The slogan of Germany’s Die Grauen ‘Us today, you 
tomorrow’, for example, sought to highlight that the party was defending the status of 
older people and the services and institutions they used on behalf of all citizens, who 
will inevitably pass through retirement and old age one day. German Greys have now 
described their party as a ‘Party of Generations’ (Generationenpartei).2 Other grey 
interest parties have sought to identify themselves as part of broader movements for 
social justice or social welfare, making common cause with other groups dependent 
on transfers from the state, such as disabled people, carers or single parents. This 
trend especially marked in Central and Eastern Europe where such groups are often 
seen as among the hardest hit of ‘transition losers’.  
 
The political leverage that ‘grey interest’ parties been able to exercise exercised has 
been limited, but not non-existent. An unexpectedly high vote for a  novel political 
formation like pensioners’ party, even of a few percent, receives disproportionate 
publicity and can be taken as a signal by  established parties already highly sensitised 
to the (largely erroneous) notion of a powerful ‘grey vote’ (Vincent, Patterson and 
Wale 2001; Goerres 2009; Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009). that they should attend more 
closely to demands and interests of older and retired voters. In addition the ‘blackmail 
potential’ derived from taking votes from other parties, ‘grey interest’ parties which 
gain parliamentary representation can often enjoy quite significant ‘coalition 
potential’  with both left and right as potential junior partners in government: 
especially in finely balanced political systems, grey interest parties’ smallness, lack of 
ideological profile and focus on specific (and hence negotiable) redistributive 
demands generally makes them attractive to both left and right as possible junior 
partners in government. Slovenia’s DeSUS, for example, has participated in three 
successive coalition governments, of centre-left, centre- right and centre-left 
respectively. 
3
 
                                                 
2
 Founded as a party in 1989, Die Grauen formally dissolved in February 2008 in consequence of party 
funding scandal (Kölnische Rundschau 2007), but has been replaced by two successor pensioners’ 
parties: the Die Grauen – Generationspartei and the Allianz Graue Panther. The former, whose leader 
are significantly younger than retirement age, is committed to the ‘grey populist’ strategy described 
later in this paper. 
 
3
 Similarly, Italy’s small Partito dei Pensionati has shuttled between the right-wing Pole of Liberty 
bloc with whom it was allied in the 2001 parliamentary elections and its centre-left rival the 
L’Unione/Olive Tree coalition, which the PP joined in February 2006 before leaving to rejoin the Pole 
of Liberty (later People of Freedom (PDL) in November 2006.  In the June 2009 European elections, 
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 Once in office pensioners’ parties, although they lack wide- political influence, are 
often able to extract specific or short-term concessions relating to the material or 
institutional support of older people. During its short tenure in government, Israel’s 
GIL party, for example, used its control the health and pensions ministries to help 
launch a new plan with a budget of 7 million shekels to improve medical care for the 
elderly, centring on rehabilitation plans operating in and across hospitals, private 
homes and the wider community (Azoulay 2007). Similarly, in 2008 Serbia’s PUPS 
blocked the rescinding of a ten per cent increase in pensions agreed as part of a 
package of spending cuts required for Serbia to obtain an IMF loan. Instead, public 
sector salaries were frozen to achieve the required spending reductions with pensions 
frozen in the subsequent year (Javno 2008). 
 
Explaining pensioners’ parties 
 
How and why have pensioners’ parties have formed?  And why have some been more 
successful than others?  The academic literature on new parties, broadly agrees that 
three sets of conditions are important for the development of new types of party: 1) 
new or unmet demands for political representation generated by changes in 
underlying socio-economic, demographic and family structures; 2) political 
institutions and patterns of political competition that present a favourable set of 
‘opportunity structures’ for new parties seeking to enter the political arena; and 3) the 
mobilization and co-ordination of sufficient material and human resources (Harmel 
and Robertson 1985; Willey 1998; Kitschelt 1989, 2007; Redding and Viterna 1999; 
Hug 2001; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2006, 2008) 
 
 
Population ageing 
 
The most basic social trend in post-industrial societies that might underlie the 
emergence of pensioners’ parties is the growing numbers of older and retired people 
in European societies.  This, it may be hypothesized, would generate both strong 
resource demands and demands for greater participation by older people leading to a 
new, more contested politics of old age (Walker 1998) At one level, demographic 
ageing seems a highly relevant factor. Certainly, the non-emergence of pensioners’ 
parties in Ireland and Iceland, the two West European states with lowest proportions 
of older and retired people, is perhaps not coincidental   
 
However, the development of pensioners’ parties cannot be accounted for simply by 
raw demographic change. In some contexts, there is only very slight correlation 
between demographic ageing and the proportion of pensioners in the population. In 
some Central and Eastern European states in 1990s, for example, numbers of older 
people and numbers of retirees diverged significantly as a result of an artificially 
induced’ pensioner boom’ stemming from the use of generous early retirement 
schemes to facilitate industrial restructuring and pre-empt social discontent following 
the fall of communism (Vanhuysse 2006). Similar, if less marked divergence can also 
be found in many West European countries (Kubitza 2005). A change of focus to 
                                                                                                                                            
the party formed part of the heterogeneous Pole of Autonomies coalition, but its MEP was not re-
elected. 
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numbers of pensioners rather than older people, however, also offers only partial 
explanation. Israel, for example, presents an obvious anomaly:  it is a case with 
relatively low proportion retired people compared to other Western democracies, 
which since 1980s has seen a succession of grey interest parties enter the political 
arena and on one occasion – that of the GIL party in 2006 – gain sufficient support to 
enter parliament and enter government. When assessing the drivers of political 
phenomena thrown up by the new politics of ageing such as pensioners’ parties it is 
therefore important to consider demographic processes of ageing as filtered through 
political and institutional context(s)   
 
The politics of pensions and welfare 
 
One such key context is that of the changing welfare state. From the 1980s the focus 
of welfare politics in Western Europe shifted from one centring on claiming resources 
and representation in an extensive, expanding welfare state to a ‘new politics of 
welfare focused on their retrenchment and reform (Pierson 1996; Vanhuysse 2001; 
Green-Pedersen and Haverland 2002). Technological, socio-economic and 
demographic changes in Western societies have also generated a range of New Social 
Risks (NSRs) to which welfare systems needed to adapt and reconfigure such as the 
provision of care for elderly relatives and social protection in a labour market 
characterized by more patterns of intermittent employment and greater participation 
of women, (Bonoli 2006). Despite important differences of content, the politics of 
post-communist welfare and pensions in Central and Eastern Europe have broadly 
mirrored those in Western Europe. As in Western Europe, CEE welfare states faced a 
politics of retrenchment and reform of pension and welfare system in the context of 
market-oriented liberal reforms and demographic change (Pop and Vanhuysse 2004).
4
 
However, post-communist societies are generally poorer than those in Western 
Europe and thus enter the ‘new politics of welfare’ with fewer resources to manage 
political change as well more complex tasks in recongfiguring welfare regimes largely 
inherited from the state socialist period  (Mukesh,  Betcherman, and Banerji 2007).  
 
The new politics of ageing, welfare and pensions have shaped the development of 
pensioners’ parties in a number of ways. Firstly, age-specific controversies relating to 
social policy have often acted as trigger events for pensioner party formation, by 
providing a focus for mobilization and an outlet for deeper sense of social and civic 
exclusion some seniors feels (usually experienced as various forms of ageism and age 
discrimination). In some cases, these were widely publicised decisions or debates over 
policies specifically or disproportionately affecting older people, often coming in a 
pre-election period. Examples of such trigger events have included  proposed cuts to 
care allowances  paid to those in retirement homes (Holland in 1994) or plans to raise 
retirement ages (misperceived as affecting those approaching retirement), which 
prompted the foundation of the Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party (SSCUP).  
 
At a deeper level welfare states can be seen been seen as a key shaper of socio-
political interests and identities (Campbell 2003), which form the social backdrop to 
                                                 
4
 As in Western democracies, post-communist welfare and pension systems in CEE proved resistant to 
reform efforts, although some states (Hungary 1997, Poland 1998; Latvia 2001; Russia 2002) did 
introduce pension reforms on World Bank models by creating a second tier of (compulsory) individual 
accounts  
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the emergence of pensioner parties.  The new politics of welfare have been 
hypothesized as generating anti-(neo-)liberal distributional demands for the retention 
of post-war social democratic or social market status quo. Generationally-based 
conflicts are said to have emerged through the interaction and mutual reinforcement 
of established welfare and health institutions and a powerful ‘grey lobby’ able to 
outcompete other  client groups such as families with children or the working poor) in 
claiming health and welfare resources. 
 
Such competition between beneficiaries of traditional welfare states and younger age 
groups facing New Social Risks (NSR) –and their different preferences regarding 
which risks should be prioritized–may, it has been suggested, be destabilising to 
existing party systems and party alignments. Kitschelt (2004: 9-10), for example, 
foresees particular problems for Christian Democratic parties in core West European 
states  where, he argues, the development of  ageing post-industrial societies will tend 
to pull apart the these parties’ post-war electoral coalitions making it difficult to 
reconcile pressures from older and retired to maintain benefits from ‘old’ welfare state 
structures with pressures to liberalize the economy, curb welfare spending and offset 
the social risks that younger and middle–aged groups will face. One option, he 
speculates, might be to jettison social protectionist groups such as (current) pensioners 
from such coalitions. Such dynamics, if realized, could clearly open up political space 
for grey interest or other challenger parties.  Such generational conflicts are echoed in 
the transitional politics of Central and Eastern Europe, where pensioners have 
generally disproportionately protected against the social consequences of market 
reform than other  ‘losers’ in the reform process such as the unemployed and poorer 
families with children (Vanhyusse 2006). 
 
Sectoral divisions 
 
Potential conflicts between generations are, however, often crosscut and inflected by 
sectoral divisions within generations. Pensioners in established Western democracies 
encompass diverse sub-groups – from prosperous retirees with generous occupational 
and private pensions to poor, marginalized older people dependent on state welfare 
guarantees. Such sectoral divisions seem particularly prominent in Bismarckian 
welfare states, which have historically offered generous pension benefits to certain 
sectorally- and gender-defined groups reflecting an organizing principle of 
maintaining occupational income and status differentials in retirement.
5
  
 
Such sectoral divisions are usually seen as impeding the capacity of pensioners and 
older people to articulate their interests as a group or take collective action.  Older 
people’s interest groups, for example, are often highly fragmented in their agendas 
and activities, which according to particular strata of older people they focus on and 
the supporting or sponsoring groups that back them (Evers and Wolf 1999; Viriot 
Durandal 2003).  In the United Kingdom for example, some campaign groups focus 
on the impact of property taxes on elderly homeowners, while trade union affiliated 
                                                 
5
 Conversely where pension provision is more universal and state-centred, retirees may form more 
homogenous and cohesive group in terms of income, lifestyle and interests. This seems most marked in 
Central and Eastern, reflecting the lower levels of differentiation of incomes and pension provision 
under state socialism, the role of the state as the main pension provider and post-transition income 
maintenance strategies after the fall of communism.(Večerník 2006; Vanhuysse, 2006. 
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groups focus on state pension indexation and NGOs with charitable status such as 
Help the Aged concentrated more on standards of social care and social services 
(Gynn and Arber 1999). 
 
However, the intersection of generational and sectoral divisions can also act as a 
catalyst for socio-political mobilization. Goerres (2009: 140-59), for example, notes 
the role of property taxes as focus for protest mobilization by older people in the 
South West of England. Moreover, the origins of Europe’s most successful grey 
interest party, Luxembourg’s Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR) – which 
has polled up to 10 per cent of the national poll and consistently been represented in 
the Luxembourg legislature since first contesting elections in 1989 – lie in precisely 
such a confluence of sectoral and generational grievances. The ADR has its origins as 
the 'Action ‘Committee for 5/6 Pensions for Everyone' , which co-ordinated protests 
in March 1987  by private sector employees (approaching retirement age), trade 
unions representing the self-employed and private sector pensioners against the more 
favourable pension regime enjoyed by state employees (Fehlen and Porier 2000: 91-
98). 
 
Opportunity structures 
 
However, the shift from lobbying or protest to party-electoral politics and the 
subsequent limited success of some grey interest grouping also requires explanation in 
terms of the broader political institutions and sets of opportunity structures facing 
(prospective) new parties. There is thus broad consensus in the literature that 
proportional electoral system which set low effective thresholds for parliamentary 
representation open up opportunities for new parties to enter the political arena. Less 
fixed and formal institutions such as patterns of party competition or party-society 
relations are also important. Volatile or fragmented party systems and relatively large 
numbers of available, weakly committed and/or discontented voters also favour the 
formation and success of new parties (Willey 1998; Hug 2001; Sikk 2005, 2006). 
Forms of interest representation represent a further aspect of the political opportunity 
structures may affect the prospects of emergent new parties. Kitschelt (1989), for 
example, suggests that strong patterns of corporatism privileging producer groups 
encourage the development of new parties because new interests struggle to find a 
voice through existing representation structures.
6
  
 
The opportunities offered to ‘grey’ parties by varying national political institutions 
such as electoral and party systems seem, at first sight, to differ little from those faced 
by other small new emergent parties in general. The success of ‘grey’ parties in 
countries with PR systems, very low thresholds, fragmented and changeable party 
systems and long traditions of minor party formation such as Holland and Israel 
comes as no surprise.  Similarly, the greater prevalence and success of pensioners’ 
parties in Eastern Europe seems closely related to the fluid and changeable nature of 
party politics in new democracies, especially during their early development (Sikk 
2005; Tavits 2008). The initially somewhat blurred distinction between the role and 
nature of interest organizations and political parties in the region during 1990s 
                                                 
6
 Others come to opposite conclusions suggesting that the corporatist-style devolution of power to 
social partners impedes the development of new parties and makes interest group politics more 
attractive (Tavits 2006). 
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(Waller 1993, Lewis 2000) also offered a favourable environment for the 
development of small interest parties. 
 
However, on closer examination a slightly more complex picture emerges. Many 
West European states have electoral systems which set relatively low thresholds for 
representation but have rarely seen new parties emerge from the political fringe. 
Conversely, while party organizations and systems in Central and Eastern Europe are 
in many cases more fluid than in the longer established party systems of Western 
Europe, the high formal electoral thresholds common across the region should 
represent a substantial obstacle to the development of small niche groupings such as 
pensioners’ parties - and a disincentive to their formation (Birch 2001; Sikk 2005). 
 
Available evidence suggests that corporatist interest intermediation structures (or their 
absence) may be of limited relevance to the development of grey interest parties. 
Feltenius (2007) finds that in Sweden, a country with relatively strong corporatist 
structures, pensioners’ interest organizations were effective in lobbying despite 
lacking formal representation on tripartite bodies. In neighbouring Slovenia, one of 
the few Central and East European countries with corporatist arrangements, the 
Slovene pensioners’ federation ZDUS has likewise had little difficulty accessing 
Slovenia’s national tripartite body, the Economic and Social Council.7 In Slovenia, 
moreover, the existence of strong, mass interest organization for older people has not 
precluded the successful development a successful pensioners’ party, DeSUS. 
 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that in Western Europe the key impediment to 
the emergence of relatively successful pensioner parties is the stability of existing 
parties and, by implication, their ability to appeal to older voters, rather than more 
formal institutional barriers such as electoral or interest representation systems. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, grey interest parties seems may  have been 
constrained more by their inability to break through formal electoral thresholds. Here, 
it is perhaps telling that most electorally successful and durable grey interest party in 
the region, DeSUS, first independently entered the country’s parliament in 1996 when 
the electoral threshold for representation was set at 3.33 per cent (Fink-Hafner 2008).  
 
Mobilizing resources 
 
Strong social demand and broad institutional opportunities are, however, in 
themselves insufficient for new parties to emerge. New parties also need access and 
organize sufficient money, media and human resources and offer policies for which 
there is electoral demand or a relevant political project (Lucardie 2000). Political 
entrepreneurs founding new parties also need to effectively co-ordinate their 
resources to overcome the collective action problems that all newly organizing groups 
face.  
 
Older people in European societies have historically lacked both significant 
organizational resources and a distinct socio-political identity, which is a crucial 
prerequisite for collective action (Dunleavy 1991). Although levels of pension 
provision vary significantly both cross-nationally and by occupation, older people 
                                                 
7
 Author ‘s telephone interview with the President of ZDUS, Dr Mateja Kozuh-Novak. 19 February 
2009. 
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experience significant reductions in income on retirement and greater levels of ill 
heath than citizens generally. Although modern welfare and pension systems have 
helped define the identity of ‘senior citizen’ or ‘elderly person’ (Wang 1999), in doing 
so they have constructed older citizens as passive and needy claimants on the state 
and society, rather than active political participants. In post-communist Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), moreover, the status of older people in the region has arguably 
declined for other reasons. Whereas youth in CEE is seen as a repository of liberal 
values and a crucial factor in bringing about change, older people are typically seen as 
an obstacle to change: as well as being a significant economic ‘loser’ group, they are 
seen as less flexible, as having a psychological stake in the institutions and practices 
of the communist past.  
 
However, the resources required to found a new small party can be modest requiring a 
relatively low critical mass of activists, finance and organization, especially in those 
states where extra-parliamentary parties which meet minimum conditions regarding 
registration, membership or votes can easily obtain state funding. In Germany, for 
example, the qualifying threshold for state funding of 0.5 per cent of the vote in 
national or European parliamentary elections, proved attainable for that country’s 
electorally very marginal pensioners’ party, Die Grauen. 
 
There are, moreover, a number of trends mitigating the resource constraints on grey 
interest mobilization. Current cohorts of older and retired people in most European 
countries are, however, are healthier, wealthier and better educated than their 
equivalents in previous decades (Eberstadt and Groth 2007, Goerres 2009). Retired 
people in Western democracies also have often accumulated sets of experience of 
civic engagement and professional skills, as well higher levels of free time, which 
may offset their lower financial and other resources. An established infrastructure of 
older people’s interest and campaign groups working can also provide a potential 
resource base for the formation of grey interest parties. Such interest groups, although 
they unusually indifferent or hostile to the notion of grey interest parties can generate 
individual political entrepreneurs and networks of activists who can act as the 
founders of such groupings.  
 
This pattern is exemplified in the formation of early West European grey interest 
parties such as Germany’s Die Grauen, Italy’s Pensioners’ Party or Slovenia’s 
DeSUS which has its origins in a local electoral list fielded in 1988 by frustrated 
members of the long-established Slovenian pensioners’ federation. In a variation on 
this pattern, older people who had previously been prominent in established parties 
and social organizations have sometimes acted as early supporters of newly formed 
grey parties as a means of continuing in public life after retiring from mainstream 
politics. This pattern can be detected in, for example, the role played in the creation 
Israeli pensioners’ parties of 1980s by former trade union leaders (Iecovich 2002) or 
in the early momentum gained by the Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party through the 
backing of retired local politicians once prominent in the Labour Party (Vincent 2003)  
 
Only in some newer democracies in Central and Eastern Europe where the civic 
infrastructure for older people - and civil and political society generally – is seriously 
under-developed does lack of resources seem to have been crucial obstacle impeding 
the development of grey interest parties.   This seems, for example, to have been the 
case in Bulgaria where regular protest movements against the financial and social 
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position of the large older and retired population since 2007 have yet to produce grey 
interest party capable of contesting national elections.  
 
Media publicity can represent an important start-up resource for overcoming 
collective action and organizational problems which face small new parties. Given the 
dominant discourse of ‘compassionate ageism’ in most European societies, which 
sees defence of older people’s interests an uncontentious non-partisan issue, newly 
established grey-interest parties  can also benefit early media interest and support.  
Pensioners’ parties often have news value as a novelty or serve as focus for populist 
media campaigning – in South-West England, for example, the activities of the tiny 
Senior Citizens Party founded in January 2004 were supported and sympathetically 
reportedly on by the regional Western Daily Press newspaper as part of a campaign to 
highlight the neglected interests of the elderly (Western Daily Press 2004). However, 
case studies suggest, sympathetic early media coverage can quickly become hostile if 
grey interest parties gather political momentum and gain a real prospect of political 
representation (Vincent 2003).  
 
The political prospects of pensioners’ parties 
 
Do pensioners’ parties have any real prospect of emerging as significant political 
actors? Although the notion of a coherent and powerful ‘grey vote’ has been shown to 
largely erroneous (Vincent, Patterson and Wale 2001; Goerres 2009) the growing 
numbers of older and retired voters in most European electorates and the increased 
salience of issues related to population ageing suggests that, all other things being 
equal, grey interest parties will have potential for further growth, especially in 
political systems that offer favourable institutional environment for new parties. 
Although political entrepreneurs seeking to establish grey interest parties are likely to 
face the additional barrier of established party loyalties among older voters developed 
over a political lifetime, there is some evidence of a nascent ‘grey’ political 
consciousness among some older voters. Opinion polling in Western Europe in the 
late 1990s (Walker 1998) - as well as more recently in Scotland (Help the Aged in 
Scotland 2005: 34-7) - suggests that large minorities of senior citizens in Europe have 
at certain points, in principle, been willing to consider supporting a pensioners’ party.8 
Moreover, many current retirees in Western Europe belong to age cohorts socialized 
in the more participatory, less deferential culture of 1960s when many West European 
party systems were undergoing dealignment, and may be more open to new political 
appeals.  Similarly, in the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe, 
although older cohorts have undergone different patterns of political socialization to 
younger voters - and some may have a degree of identification with former ruling 
communist parties or ‘historic’ parties with roots in the pre-communist period - the 
absence of competitive party systems before 1989 has left voter-party linkages across 
the region comparatively loose. 
 
However, even if they are likely to become more a frequent phenomenon in European 
politics, grey interest parties seem unlikely to advance beyond minor party status. 
There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, although less constraining than 
                                                 
8
  Eurobarometer polling date for Western Europe from 1992 cited by Walker (1998) finds that 
between 14 per cent (Germany) and 42 per cent (Portugal) of those aged over 60 would consider 
joining an age-based party promoting their interests. The average across the (then) EU12 was 22 per 
cent 
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sometimes argued, class, sectoral and social divisions among older people; established 
political identities and loyalties; and competition for established parties clearly set 
limits on the ability of grey interest parties to win the support of their chosen 
constituency.  Available case study evidence suggests that grey parties’ inroads into 
the elderly and retired electorate have rarely exceeded 20 per cent. Slovenia’s DeSUS, 
for example, has estimated that it gains about 15 per cent support among older and 
retired voters (DeSUS 2002).
9
 This suggests that even in ageing democracies where 
retired and older people form a high and growing proportion of the population– and 
typically – and make up a still higher proportion of the electorate due to higher rates 
of turnout (Goerres 2007) -  the total potential vote for grey interest parties lies in the 
region of 5 -15 per cent. Even allowing for doubling or trebling of grey parties’ ability 
to convert sympathy into electoral backing that might come with additional finance, 
better organization or greater professionalism, this implies electoral scores of between 
2 and 7 per cent.
10
  
 
Towards a grey populism? 
 
Some pensioners’ parties seem content to play the role of niche minor party groupings 
representing sub-constituencies of older voters attracted by ‘grey’ politics. In some 
cases this because their activity is focused on goals such as winning publicity, rather 
than challenging for electoral representation. For other more successful groupings 
such as Slovenia’s DeSUS, it reflects caution about changing a formula that has 
already brought a degree of political success.
11
 Other grey parties, however, have 
sought to broaden their appeal beyond the claim to be a special representative for 
older people. Such efforts reflect both the electoral need to boost low levels of voter 
support and the fact that overtly representing sectional interests in the party political 
arena is widely seen as less legitimate than general programmatic appeals.  
 
One such strategy for broadening the base of grey interest parties is to link demands 
on behalf of pensioners and older people with anti-establishment or anti-political 
protest positions, which likely to appeal to unaffiliated and disaffected voters from 
other age groups. Some grey interest groups have effected this by simply merging 
with populist groupings, effectively becoming the ‘seniors’ platforms’ of such protest 
parties.
12
 Other pensioners’ parties have fused grey interest politics and populism in 
more creative ways. One such example can be founded in the GIL party’s successful 
                                                 
9
 Similarly, evidence for the Czech Republic suggests that the Czech Pensioners for a Secure Life 
(DŽJ) party gained no more 13 per cent of pensioners’ voters during its best national election 
performance in 1992 (Kopeček 2005; Večerník 2006: 6) and was favoured by one in five Czech voters 
aged 60 or above during a short surge in popularity in the run-up to elections in 1998 (Hartl, Huk and 
Haberlová 1999).  
 
10
 As Mair (2001) notes, on aggregate in West European democracies even large, well established 
parties such Christian Democrats and Social Democrats only manage to garner the electoral support of 
around 40 per cent of those who say they potentially sympathetic to these parties. 
11
 Interview with the General Secretary of DeSUS Pavel Brglez, Ljubljana, 9 December 2008. 
12
 For example, in 2005 significant elements of the Antwerp based Flemish pensioners party WOW 
joined far-right Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang) party contributing to the organization of VB’s 
Seniors’ Forum in that city.  Similarly, in 2006 Russian Pensioners’ Party’s merged into the left-wing 
nationalist Fair Russia (SR) bloc and the Czech Pensioners for a Secure Life (DŽJ) was absorbed by 
the populist, eurosceptic Independent Democrats party (NEZ). 
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campaign in Israel’s 2006 parliamentary elections, which saw it unexpectedly enter 
the Knesset.  Although GIL polled well in population centres with large retired 
populations (Izenberg 2006), the party also gained the support of young professional 
voters in metropolitan districts in Tel Aviv, who reportedly saw GIL as a novel but 
safe form of protest voting, justifiable as a charitable gesture of solidarity with their 
grandparents’ generation. Indeed, GIL’s election strategy consciously sought to 
combine appeals for justice and empowerment for older people with an irreverent 
campaign targeted at young voters calling for anti-establishment protest voting 
(Urquhart 2006; Derfner 2006).
13
 
 
The 3.8 per cent unexpectedly polled by Germany’s Die Grauen in the 2006 regional 
elections in Berlin stemmed from a very similar hybrid strategy combining demands 
for material improvements for older people; appeals to vote against the corruption and 
inertia of established parties; and a deliberately controversial poster campaign urging 
older voters to ‘Screw for a Secure Retirement’ (McKay 2007; Bekler 2008). A more 
advanced fusion of populism and ‘grey’ politics can, however, be found in 
Luxembourg’s ADR, which has shifted from demands for ‘pension justice’ for those 
employed outside the state sector towards a more general anti-establishment stance 
critical of corruption, wasteful public spending and elite projects such as European 
integration (Fehlen and Poirier 2000: 95-9).  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Over the past two decades pensioners’ parties have been a widespread and recurrent 
minor party phenomenon in both Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Although in 
most cases they have remained fringe groupings – albeit sometimes of considerable 
longevity - in a smaller number of cases, they have enjoyed a degree of electoral 
success, gaining national parliamentary representation and exercised some political 
influence. ‘Grey interest’ parties operating at the margins of European party systems, 
this paper suggests, should be taken seriously and analysed using the broader 
comparative frameworks used to analyse new party formation.  
 
Although there are considerable – and probably insurmountable – barriers blocking 
their development into major political actors, given the right institutional and political 
opportunities grey interest parties can draw on sufficient socio-political demand to 
establish themselves as minor parties. In this regard the ability of some grey parties to 
link age-based demands with sectoral or populist discontent with the political systems 
of ageing democracies may be of particular significance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 GIL’s success in 2006 was also facilitated by the charismatic appeal of its leader, the retired 
intelligence office Rafi Eitan, well known as the commander of the covert operation in 1960 which 
abducted Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann for trial in to Jerusalem. 
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Table 1: Pensioners parties in Western Europe and Israel 
 
Belgium Waardig Ouder Worden (WOW) 
Founded 1994 
European elections 1994 2.14% 
Flemish parliamentary elections 2004, 0.02% 
 
Denmark Active Pensioners Party (Partiet Aktive Pensionister) 
 
Founded 1997 
Contested local elections 2005 
Has not contested national elections 
 
Finland 1. Joint Responsibility Party of Pensioners and Greens 
Parliamentary elections 1991, 0.1% 
 
2. Independent Non-Aligned Pensioners in Finland 
Parliamentary elections 1991, 0.19% 
 
3. Pensioners for the People (EKA) 
Parliamentary elections 1995, 0.2% 
Parliamentary elections 1999 0.2% 
 
4. Finnish Pensioners' Party (SEP - Suomen eläkeläisten 
puolue) 
1987, 1.22% 
Parliamentary elections 1991, 0.39% 
Parliamentary elections 1995, 0.1% 
Parliamentary elections 1999, 0.2% 
Germany 1. The Greys – Gray Panthers Die Grauen – Graue 
Panther) 
Founded 1989 (as pressure group 1975) 
Formally dissolved in 2008 
 
1990 0.8%% PR lists? 
1994  0.4% Single Member Districts, 0.5% PR  lists 
1998 0.3% Single Member Districts, 0.3% PR lists 
2002  0.2% Single Member Districts, 0,2 PR lists 
2005 0.0 Single Member District (6340 votes), PR list 
0.4% 
 
2004 European elections 1.2% 
 
2. The Greys –Party of Generations (Die Grauen – 
Generationspartei) 
Founded 2008 
 
3. Grey Panther Alliance (Allianz Graue Panther) 
Founded 2008  
 
Holland 1. General Elderly Alliance (Algemeen Ouderen Verbond, 
AOV) 
Founded 1993 
 
1994 parliamentary election, 3.6% 6 seats (of 150) 
Did not contest subsequent parliamentary elections 
 
Represented at sub-national (provincial) level (provincial 
elections in 1995-2003). Gained seats in upper chamber 
1995-8 on basis on provincial representation 
 
2. Union 55+ 
Founded 1992 
1994 parliamentary election,  0.8%, 1 seat 
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Sub-national (provincial) representation in coalition with 
AOV 
 
3. Elderly Union (Ouderenunie). 
Formed 1998 from merger of AOV and Union 55+ 
1998 parliamentary election,  0.5% 
 
4. United Seniors Party (Verenigde Senioren Partij  - 
VSP) 
Formed 2001 from merger of Elderly Union and Seniors 
Party 
2002 parliamentary elections 0.4% 
2003 parliamentary elections – not contested 
2006 parliamentary elections 0.1% 
 
Limited sub-national representation 
 
Italy 1. Autonomous Party of Pensioners 
Contested parliamentary elections 1972 
 
2. Pensioners' Party: Partito Pensionati) 
 
Founded 1987 
1999 European elections 0.8%, no seats 
2004 European elections, 1.1%, 1 seat 
2006 parliamentary elections, 0.88% Part of centre-left 
Union grouping 
2008 parliamentary election – candidates presented as part 
of People of Freedom bloc 
 
 
Israel 1. Older Persons and Pensioners Party of Israel 
(HaGimlain Vhakshishim BeIsrael) 
Founded 1981 
1981 parliamentary elections, 0.1% 
 
2. ‘Pensioners’ (Gimlaim) 
Founded 1988 
1988 parliamentary elections, 0.73% 
1992 parliamentary elections in coalition with Hand by 
Hand (Yad beyad) party representing ex-Soviet 
immigrants, 0.31% 
 
3. Power for Pensioners (Koah LaGimlaim), parliamentary 
elections 1999, 1.1%, no seats 
 
4. Pensioners of Israel to the Knesset (GIL) Gimla'ey 
Yisrael LaKnesset 
Founded 1996 
1996 parliamentary elections, 0.57%,  
2006 parliamentary elections, 5.92%, 7 seats (of 120) 
2009 parliamentary elections, 0.52% 
 
Luxembourg 1. Alternative Democratic Reform party (ADR)* 
(Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei/ Parti réformiste 
d'alternative démocratique/Alternative Demokratische 
Reformpartei) 
 
Founded 1987 
 
1989 parliamentary elections 7.3%, 4 seats (of 60) 
1994  parliamentary elections 9.0%, 5  seats 
1999 parliamentary elections 11.3%, 7 seats 
2004 parliamentary elections  9.9% 5 seats 
2009 parliamentary elections, 8,1%  4 seats 
 
Subnational representation since 1993  
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2. Party of the Third Age (Partei vum 3. Alter, Parti du 
troisième age) 
 
1999 parliamentary elections 0.1% 
2004 parliamentary elections 0.4% in one constituency 
 
Now disbanded 
 
Norway Pensioners Party (Pensjonistpartiet). 
Founded 1985.  
 
1985 parliamentary elections 0.3% 
1989 parliamentary elections 0.3% 
1993 parliamentary elections 1.0% 
1997 parliamentary elections 0.6 
2001  parliamentary elections 0.7% 
2005 parliamentary election 0.5% 
 
Never represented at national level.  
Some subnational representation. 
 
Portugal Party of National Solidarity (Partido da Solidariedade 
Nacional – PSN) 
Founded 1990 
 
1991 Parliamentary elections  1.7%, 1 seat (of 230) 
1995 Parliamentary elections 0.2% 
1999 Parliamentary elections 0.2% 
2002 Parliamentary elections 0.0% 
 
Spain  Active Pensioners’ Party (Partido de los Pensionistas en 
Acción – PDLPEA 
Founded 2007 
 
2008 parliamentary elections  0.01% 
Sweden  Swedish Senior Citizen Interest Party (Sveriges 
Pensionärers Intresseparti) 
Founded 1987 
 
1991 parliamentary elections 0.04% 
1994  parliamentary elections 0.04% 
1998 parliamentary elections 1.0% 
2003 parliamentary elections 0.71% 
2006 parliamentary elections 0.52%. 
Never represented at national level. 
 
Some subnational representation 
UK 
 
- Scotland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- England and Wales 
 
 
Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party (SSCUP) 
Founded 2003 
2003 Scottish parliamentary elections, 0.1% in Single 
Member Districts, 1.5% of regional list votes, 1 seat 
 
2007 Scottish parliamentary elections, 1.92% of regional 
list vote, no seats 
 
 
Senior Citizens Party 
2005 European elections 
 
*Name since 2006. Previously ‘Action Committee – 5/6 Pensions for All’ (1987-9), ‘Action Committee 5/6’ 
(1989-92), ‘Action Committee for Democracy and Pensions Justice’ 
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Sources: http://www.parties-and-elections.de;  Iecovich 2002; Israeli Knesset; 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_res.htm; The Times, 5 May 2007; German Federal 
Returning Officer http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de; www.electionresources.org; Statistics Norway www.ssb.no; 
Swedish Election Authority www.val.se and personal communication 10 January 2008; Statistics Norway 
www.ssb.no 
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Table 2: Pensioners parties in Eastern Europe 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovinia 1. Pensioners' Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stranka Penzionera Umirovljenika 
BiH)  
Parliamentary elections 2002, 1.4%, 2 (of 140) in parliament of Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Croat-Bosnian entity); 1 seat (of 42) in Bosnian parliament (both 
entities) 
Parliamentary elections 2006, 1.48%, no representation in parliament of Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina or Bosnian parliament 
 
2. Pensioners' Party of the Republika Srpska (Penzionerska Stranka Republike 
Srpske)  
Parliamentary elections 2002, 1 seat (of 83) in National Assembly of the Serb 
Republic within Bosnia. 
Parliamentary elections 2006,  2.49% no seats in National Assembly of the Serb 
Republic within Bosnia. 
 
Bulgaria Social Solidarity Movement 
Founded May 2007 
 
Croatia Croatian Pensioners' Party (Hrvatska stranka umirovljenika, HSU) 
Founded 1996 
Parliamentary election 2003 – 4%, 3 seats (of 151) 
Parliamentary election 2007 -  4.1% 1 seat (of  153) 
Some sub-national (communal/municipal) representation 
 
Czech Republic Pensioners for a Secure Life (Duchodci za životní jistoty, DŽJ  )*  
Parliamentary election 1992**, 3.77% 
Parliamentary election 1996, 3.09% 
Parliamentary election 1998, 3.06% 
Parliamentary election 2002, 0.86% 
Some sub-national (communal/municipal) representation 
 
Merged with Independent Democrats (ND) grouping 2006 
Estonia 1. Estonian Pensioners' Union (Eesti Pensionaride Liit) 
Parliamentary elections 1992, 3.71% 
Some sub-national (communal/municipal) representation 
 
2. Estonian Pensioners and Families Union (Eesti Pensionäride ja Perede Liit) 
Contested 1995 election as part of Coalition Party and Country People’s Alliance 
(KMÜ). Later renamed the Estonian Pensioners and Families Party (Eesti 
Pensionäride ja Perede Erakond, EPPE) . Merged with the Estonia People’s Party in 
1999. 
 
Hungary  Pensioners' Party (Nyugdijasok Partja, NYUP   ) 
Parliamentary elections 1994, 0.02% (SMD)  
Parliamentary elections 2002, 0.00%**8 (SMD) 
 
Poland 1. Legnica Association of Pensioners and Invalids (Polski Zw. Emerytów, Rencistów i 
Inw. O/W Legnica) Parliamentary elections 1991 - 0.04% 
 
2. Disabled, Retired Persons and Pensioners ("Niepelnosprawni, Emeryci i Rencisci")  
Parliamentary elections 1991 - 0.04% 
 
3. National Party of Pensioners and Retired Persons (Krajowa Partia Emerytów I 
Rencistów,  KPEiR)  
Parliamentary elections 1997 - 2.18% 
 
4. National Alliance of Pensioners and Retired Persons of the Polish Republic 
(Krajowe Porozumienia Emerytów i Rencistów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, KPPiRRP) 
Parliamentary elections 1997 - 1.63% 
 
Romania 1. Party of Pensioners of Romania (Partidul Pensionarilor din Romania, PPR) 
Parliamentary election 2000 – 0.66% 
 
2. Popular and Social Protection Party (Partidul Popular şi al Protecţiei Sociale) 
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Parliamentary elections 2008 – 0.12% 
Russia Pensioners’ Party**** (Partiya pensionerov, PP) 
Parliamentary elections 1999, 1.95% (national PR list), 0.71% (SMDs), 1 deputy 
elected in SMD 
 
Alliance of Pensioners' Party and Russian Social Justice Party 
2003 Parliamentary elections 3.1% (national PR list), 0.5% (SMDs) 
 
Merged with Fair Russia bloc in 2006 
 
 
Slovakia 1. Party of Pensioners and the Socially Dependent (Strana dôchodcov a sociálne 
odkázaných, SDSO ) 
 
Founded May 1995 
Did not contest national election 
Officially deregistered October 2005 
 
2. Pensioners’ Party of Slovakia (SDS - Strana dôchodcov Slovenska) 
Formed October 1995 
Contested 2002 parliamentary elections on electoral list of Real Slovak National Party 
(PSNS). No deputies 
Officially deregistered October 2005 
 
Slovenia Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (Demokratična stranka upokojencev 
Slovenije, DeSUS) 
 
Parliamentary elections 1992, contested as part of United List of Social Democrats 
(ZLSD),  1 seat 
Parliamentary elections 1996 4.32% 5 seats (of 90) 
Parliamentary elections 2000, 5.17%, 4 seats 
Parliamentary elections 2004, 4.0%, 4 seats 
Parliamentary elections 2008, 7.47% , 7 seats 
 
Incumbent since 2000 
2000-4 - coalition with Liberal Democrats (LDS), United Social Democrats (ZSLD) 
and Slovene People’s Party. No ministerial portfolio, deputy speakership of 
parliament. 
 
2004- date, coalition with Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), New Slovenia – 
Christian People's Party (NSi), Slovenian People's Party (SLS). 
One ministerial portfolio (defence) 
 
Serbia Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (Partija ujedinenich pensionera Srbije, PUPS) 
Founded 2005 
 
2007 parliamentary elections - (in coalition with Social Democratic Party)  3.91% 5 
seats (of 250) 
 
Ukraine Bloc of the Party  of Pensioners of Ukraine (Blok Partii Pensioneriv Ukrainy - BPPU)  
- coalition of Party of Pensioners of Ukraine and Party of Protection of Pensioners of 
Ukraine 
 
2007 parliamentary elections 0.14% 
 
 
*Later the Party for a Secure Life (Strana za životní jistoty) 
** Figures for election to Czech parliament (Czech National Council) 
*** 685 votes (1245 votes in 1994) 
**** Subsequently merged with Rodina and other parties into Fair Russia bloc 
 
Sources 
Central Electoral Commission of Bosnia and Hercegovina http://www.izbori.ba;   
Czech Central Election Commission (www.volby.cz); Essex Election Archive 
(www.essex.ac.uk/elections); Russia Votes (www.russiavotes.org);  Republic of Slovenia Electoral 
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Commission (http://www.sigov.si/elections/rvk.html); Republic of Serbia Electoral Commission 
(http://www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu/index_e.htm); Slovak Ministry of the Interior as reported at  
http://www.civil.gov.sk/archiv/POLIT/zoz_psph_04072006.htm; ‘Pensioners’ Party Set Up in 
Bulgaria’, Novinite news agency report, 12 May 2007, 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=80585; Slovenian Government Communication Office, 
‘Slovenia Gets Its Sixth Government’, December 2000 
http://www.ukom.gov.si/eng/slovenia/background-information/elections2000-government/; 
http://volitve.gov.si/dz2008/en/rezultati/rezultati_slo.html; Central Europe Review, 29 November 1999 
http://www.ce-review.org/99/23/estonianews23.html; Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania 
(www.roaep.ro/en/index.php) 
 
 
 
